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ABSTRACT
In the global economy, the intermediate companies owned by multinational corporations are becom-
ing an important policy issue as they are likely to cause international profit shifting and diversion
of foreign direct investments. The purpose of this analysis is to call the intermediate companies
with high risk of international profit shifting as key firms and to identifying and clarify them. For
this aim, we propose a model that focuses on each affiliate’s position on the ownership structure
of each multinational corporation. Based on the information contained in the Orbis database, we
constructed the Global Ownership Network, reflecting the relationship that can give significant in-
fluence to a firm, and analyzed for large multinational corporations listed in Fortune Global 500.
In this analysis, first, we confirmed the validity of this model by identifying affiliates playing an
important role in international tax avoidance at a certain degree. Secondly, intermediate companies
are mainly found in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, etc., and tended to be located in ju-
risdictions favorable to treaty shopping. And it was found that such key firms are concentrated on
the IN component of the bow-tie structure that the giant weakly connected component of the Global
Ownership Network consist of. Therefore, it clarifies that the key firms are geographically located in
specific jurisdictions, and concentrates on specific components in the Global Ownership Network.
The location of key firms are related with the ease of treaty shopping, and there is a difference in the
jurisdiction where key firms are located depending on the location of the multinational corporations.
Keywords Ownership network · Bow-tie structure · Profit shifting · Treaty shopping · Hierarchical identification
Introduction
Multinational corporations (MNCs) and their affiliates in various jurisdictions have become important players in the
globalized world. However, they have been recognized as important players in policy issues and their ownership
structures have become more complicated (UNCTAD 2016). The presence of intermediate companies is the major
factors contributing to such complex structures. MNCs usually operate through their local affiliates and indirectly
through intermediate companies. Various factors influence their decision for using such intermediate companies for
their business operations. Improving management efficiency and avoiding legal risks are some of the reasons: however,
the biggest reason is to minimize withholding tax liability (Eicke 2009).
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
12
39
7v
1 
 [e
co
n.G
N]
  2
8 A
pr
 20
19
Identification of Key Companies for International Profit Shifting in the Global Ownership NetworkA PREPRINT
Basically, each jurisdiction imposes withholding tax on the profits relocated to other jurisdictions; however, if two ju-
risdictions conclude a tax treaty and agree to offer a withholding tax reduction to companies in each other jurisdiction,
companies located in those two jurisdictions can enjoy these tax benefits (Arnold 2016). Therefore, only companies
located in the jurisdictions of contracting a tax treaty are provided with the relief of withholding tax. Companies
located in other jurisdictions are not qualified to enjoy this withholding tax reduction because their jurisdictions do
not conclude a tax treaty. To meet this withholding tax reduction requirements, MNCs often establish intermediate
companies in the jurisdictions that offer these reliefs despite conducting no reasonable business purpose in these ju-
risdictions (Vega Borrego 2006). This technique is called treaty shopping using intermediate companies to minimize
withholding tax liability. Treaty shopping is one of the schemes of international profit shifting and a scheme against
the fairness of tax liability (Avi-Yonah and Panayi 2010). Many MNCs avoid tax liability by establishing intermediate
companies and making ownership structures complicated (Maine and Nguyen 2017).
Moreover, intermediate companies are indispensable elements for taxation purpose and for the cross-border invest-
ment. MNCs also create foreign direct investment (FDI) through their affiliates or intermediate companies (Weyzig
2013). Although investment is made through a third-party country, statistics on FDI are in bilateral units, which can-
not reveal the actual amount of FDI. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development recommends that
member countries should separate detoured FDI from the actual amount of FDI (Borga 2015) because the detours are
in a large global economy and this is difficult to be ignored.The reason is based on the MNCs’ indirect ownership of
their intermediate companies.
Thus, it is important to understand how the tax policy of each jurisdiction influences the flow of capital inside MNCs
for tackling international profit shifting. In addition, it is essential to grasp detoured FDI made through intermediate
companies to understand the realities of the current global economy. On the basis of this background, we analyze the
activities of intermediate companies.
Since the 1990s, network science has made remarkable progress (Newman 2003; Holme and Sarama¨ki 2012 et al.)
and has presented a new way of looking at the entire society, revealing that the relationship between the elements or
actors determines the behavior of each element or actor. In recent years, the development of economic data has reached
an exponential growth, and the ownership of the network that represents a special type of economic networks is one
of such examples. The ownership network has been analyzed from various aspects such as the topology of sharehold-
ing relationships in the Italian and the United States stock markets (Battiston 2004); the control of ownership among
European companies (Glattfelder and Battiston 2009) in geographical space (Vitali and Battiston 2011). The archi-
tecture and structure of the ownership network is an effective way to assess the complexity of the ownership such as
transnational corporations (Vitali et al. 2011; Vitali and Battiston 2014). Especially, understanding the complexity of
the ownership hierarchies of large bank holding companies assist in reaching a resolution is required when a company
goes bankrupt (Flood et al. 2017). The ownership network also is applied to the context of international taxation and
analysis of offshore financial centers (Gracia-Bernardo et al. 2017). Comprehending connectivities in the real world
helps us to understand the economic growth and incomes more clearly (Gould et al. 2018).
Many studies on international taxation focus on macroeconomic data. However, such analyses have limitations because
macroeconomic data contain many noises and biases. Since FDI is related to bilateral units, it is difficult to capture
the diversion of FDI perpetuated by MNCs for treaty shopping. In recent years, many studies have used microdata
because of the exponential growth of data. However, most of the studies use ownership information to determine
whether a company is an affiliate of an MNC, and these studies do not consider ownership relations of affiliates. Thus,
the information is not enough to understand the diversion of FDI. Although a few studies considered the ownership
relations among affiliates, however, they only analyzed MNCs located in specific countries (Collins and Shackelford
1998; Mintz and Weichenrieder 2010). Their analysis was not on global trends. To the best of our knowledge, only one
study adopts the network science approach in conducting a global analysis of ownership relations (Garcia-Bernardo et
al. 2017). However, their approach is designed on the trend of jurisdictions not paying attention to each affiliate.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the complicated ownership structure of MNCs from the viewpoint of network
science, considering their attitude toward tax and international profit shifting. We refer to intermediate companies as
key companies involved in a high-risk international profit shifting. Thus, we propose a model that hierarchically
identifies these companies as affiliates of MNCs. The feature of this model is to consider ownership relations among
affiliates and the position of affiliates in the ownership structure of each MNC. We newly introduce the concept called
layer to identify the key companies that are at risk in international profit shifting.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In the Dataset section, we mention the databases that are used to build
the Global Ownership Network (GON). In the Model section, we propose and explain the model to identify the key
companies that are at high risk in international profit shifting. In the Results section, we describe the structure of the
GON and the locations of key companies described in our model. In the Discussion section, we discuss the results in
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the context of international taxation. In the Conclusion section, we explain our analysis briefly and outline important
results and their implications.
Dataset
We construct the GON based on the ownership information in the Orbis 2015 database. Generally, the larger MNCs
face a high risk in international profit shifting. We analyze MNCs listed in the Fortune Global 500.
Orbis Database
In this analysis, we use the Orbis database (Bureau van Dijk 2015), which comprises financial information of
59,581,452 companies and individuals located across 215 jurisdictions. Information on the balance sheet, profit and
loss accounts, the standard industrial classification (SIC), geographical position, and the ownership structure are pro-
vided.
The database contains information of each company as it is reported to the Ministry of Commerce of each jurisdiction.
The recording rates of company’s information vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and this depends on the size
of the companies. Small companies are less likely to be included because of their lack of accuracy (Kalemi-Ozcan et
al. 2015). Moreover, companies located in low-income jurisdictions are less likely to be included (Cobham & Loretz
2014). Lack of financial data in certain no-corporate-tax jurisdictions is a serious issue, but this can be mitigated the
ownership relations, although all ownership relationships still are not included in the database. Moreover, it is difficult
to evaluate the magnitude and importance of the missing ownership relationships due to a general lack of data on
actual ownership relations. However, an important number of ownership relations in no-corporate tax jurisdictions
are identified among MNCs listed in the Fortune Global 500 (OECD 2015). Although the database suffers from
potential biases, it has been widely used for tax empirical analyses because it is considered as the most comprehensive
commercially available company-level global database at present (Fuest & Riedel 2012; Dharmapala 2014).
We establish the GON to clarify ownership structures of MNCs. This network is a weightless directed graphG ∈ V,E
composing a set of nodes V and a set of links E on the basis of ownership information included in the Orbis database.
A node u represents a company or an individual. The link e ∈ E is a set of ordered pair e = (u, v) (where u, v ∈ V )
represents a shareholding relationship; u is a company, and v is its shareholder; self-loops are excluded (u 6= v).
Fortune Global 500
The focus of this analysis is on MNCs listed in the Fortune Global 500. Fortune magazine complies and publishes
Fortune Global 500, which are the most 500 largest companies that sell worldwide based on their total revenues
(Fortune 2015). In 2017, listed MNCs have sold products worth $30 trillion and hired 67.7 million people worldwide,
so it can be said that they are representatives of huge MNCs.
Previous studies on intermediate companies have been limited to MNCs in the US and Germany (Collins and Shack-
elford 1998; Mintz and Weichenrieder 2010). In our study, we are not focusing on the locations of MNCs but on their
sizes because large MNCs are likely to shift their profits to other jurisdictions. 1. Therefore, we target 480 MNCs with
the the largest sales in the world that have the records of their headquarters in the Orbis database and that are listed in
the Fortune Global 500.
Figure 1 shows SIC of MNCs listed in the Fortune Global 500 (subject to our analysis) according to the statistical
classification of economic activity in the European Community Second Edition (NACE Rev. 2). Information on SIC
is based on the Orbis database. Many MNCs listed in the Fortune Global 500 operate in the manufacturing industry or
financial insurance industry.
Figure 2 represents the locations of the headquarters of the MNCs based on the analysis of the corporate tax rate of
each jurisdiction on the world map. Almost half of the MNCs have their headquarters in the US, China, and Japan that
have relatively high statutory corporate tax rates. It is suggested that the locations of the MNCs’ headquarters have
nothing to do with the height of the statutory corporate tax rate.
1International profit shifting costs the associated costs of constructing a complicated ownership structure and receiving expert
advice familiar with the tax system of each jurisdiction.
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Figure 1: SIC of the headquarters of the MNCs subject to this analysis. A is Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing. B
is Mining and Quarrying. C is Manufacturing. D is Electricity, Gas, steam, and Air conditioning supply. E is Water
supply, Sewerage, Waste management, and Remediation activities. F is Construction. G is Wholesale and Retail trade,
and Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles. H is Transportation and Storage. I is Accommodation and Food service
activities. J is Information and Communication. K is Financial and Insurance activities. L is Real estate activities.
M is Professional, Scientific, and Technical activities. N is Administrative and Support service activities. O is Public
administration and Defense, and Compulsory social security. Q is Human health and Social work activities. R is Arts,
Entertainment, and Recreation. V is no information in the dataset.
0 83.7
Figure 2: Geographical distribution of the headquarters of the MNCs subject to this analysis and statutory
corporate tax rate. The size of the circles represents the number of headquarters of the MNCs subject to this analysis
and the depth of the color indicates the statutory corporate tax rate, by the jurisdiction.
Model
We propose a model to identify intermediate companies, which are key companies, that are likely to play an important
role in MNCs reallocation of their profits for tax purpose, namely, international profit shifting2. Our model consists
of two parts: “holding" company and “conduit" company centralities and hierarchical identification algorithm. We
propose the “holding" company and “conduit" company centralities on the basis of “sink" and “conduit" outward
centralities, which were proposed and proved to be effective in identifying jurisdictions used for tax purpose by
Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2017). Unlike the “sink" and “conduit" outward centralities, the “holding" company and
“conduit" company centralities do not need financial information and are calculated hierarchically when identifying
the key companies.
2To confirm that a company really involves in international profit shifting or international tax avoidance, we need to consider
the legitimacy of the company’s business (Okamura and Sakai 2018).
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The structure of the Model section is as follows: In the Key companies subsection, we make the concept of the key
companies clear and mention that key companies have hierarchical relationships. In the Centralities for Jurisdictions
subsections, we briefly introduce the “sink" and “conduit" outward centralities, which the “holding" company and
“conduit" company centralities are based on. In the Calculation of the Amount of the Capital subsection, we point
out that the “sink" and “conduit" outward centralities have the difficulty of identifying affiliates used for tax purpose
in terms of financial information and explain our idea for overcoming the difficulty. In the Centralities for Affiliates
subsection, we propose the “holding" company and “conduit" company centralities, which are able to identify the key
companies, using the idea. In the Hierarchical Identification Algorithm subsection, we describe how the “holding"
company and “conduit" company centralities are implemented for identifying the key companies.
Key Companies
In this analysis, MNC’s affiliates are categorized following the classification of Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2017), which
classified jurisdictions used for tax purposes into two types: “sink" and “conduit." The “sink" jurisdiction attracts and
parks large capital for mitigating corporate tax, whereas the “conduit" jurisdiction allows MNCs to route their capital
from other (especially, high tax) jurisdictions to the “sink" jurisdictions without withholding tax3. Corresponding with
their classification, we categorize MNCs’ affiliates used for tax purposes into two types: “holding" and “conduit." The
“holding" company is defined as the affiliate that parks large capital of other affiliates, whereas the “conduit" company
is defined as the affiliate that allows MNCs to route their capital from other affiliates to the “holding" companies 4.
From the viewpoint of the ownership relations, we consider that key company satisfies two conditions. First, in
the realm of international taxation, holding companies are classified into three, depending on their locations: home
country, host country, and third country (Mintz and Weichenrieder 2010). The third country is located in a different
jurisdiction from its headquarters and one of its underlying affiliates, is thought to be a key company because this type
is likely to be used for international profit shifting. We call this condition as “the condition of the third country type."
Next, From the viewpoints of affiliates’ position in the ownership structures, we assume that “holding" company and
“conduit" company make a hierarchical relationships (Maine and Nguyen 2017). In other words, “holding" company
is tied with a “conduit" company by ownership links.
Centralities for Jurisdictions
To identify jurisdictions functioning as “sink" and “conduit," Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2017) proposed the “sink" and
“conduit" outward centralities. The “sink" and “conduit" outward centralities measured the amount of foreign capital
flowing in an ownership network. Before explaining our new centralites, that are the “holding" company and “conduit"
company centralities, we briefly introduce the “sink" and “conduit" outward centralities, which the “holding" company
and “conduit" company centralities are based on.
Sink Centrality
The “sink" centrality measured the amount of foreign capital parked in a jurisdiction and identified the jurisdictions
attracting a lot of capital from other jurisdictions. The “sink" centrality Sj evaluated the amount of capital parked in a
jurisdiction j as follows: First, they calculated the difference between the total amount of foreign capital entering into
the jurisdiction j and the total amount of foreign capital leaving the jurisdiction j. Next, the difference was divided
by the total amount of capital flowing in an entire ownership network. Finally, the centrality was normalized using the
economic scale of the jurisdiction j.
Sj =
V inj − V outj∑
i V
in
i
·
∑
iGDPi
GDPj
(1)
Here, V inj was the total amount of foreign capital entering the jurisdiction j; V
out
j was the total amount of foreign
capital leaving the jurisdiction j;
∑
i V
in
i was the total amount of capital flowing in the entire ownership network.
GDPj is the GDP of the jurisdiction j; and
∑
iGDPi is the total of the GDP of all jurisdictions. The GDP was
assumed to represent the economic scale of a jurisdiction. The “sink" centrality Sj was normalized by an economic
scale of an jurisdiction j as it was supposed that the difference between the total amount of foreign capital entering a
jurisdiction and those leaving the jurisdiction was proportional to the economic scale of the jurisdiction j. When the
3Withholding tax is usually imposed on the dividends when a firm pays its dividends to another firm in another jurisdiction.
4We call an affiliate that corresponds to “sink" as “holding" because such affiliate is usually called as a holding company by
experts of international taxation (Picciotto 1992; Ginsberg 1994).
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difference (foreign capital parked in the jurisdiction j) was not proportional, the “sink" centrality Sj became large and
it was suggested that the jurisdiction j functioned as “sink." They supposed that a jurisdiction with its “sink" centrality
exceeding 10 functioned as “sink," comparing with the jurisdictions empirically known as "sink."
Conduit Outward Centrality
The “conduit" outward centrality measured the amount of foreign capital passed through a jurisdiction and identified
the jurisdictions allowing foreign capital to be routed5. The “conduit" outward centrality Cj evaluated the amount
of foreign capital routed through a jurisdiction j as follows: First, they divided the amount of foreign capital routed
from other jurisdictions to the “sink" jurisdictions through the jurisdiction j by the total amount of capital in an entire
ownership network. Next, the centrality was normalized using the economic scale of the jurisdiction j.
Cj =
V passj∑
i V
pass
i
·
∑
iGDPi
GDPj
(2)
Here, V passj is the total amount of foreign capital routed through the jurisdiction j; and
∑
i V
pass
i is the total amount
of foreign capital routed in an entire ownership network. GDPj is the GDP of the jurisdiction j and
∑
iGDPi is the
total of the GDP of all jurisdictions in an entire ownership network. The GDP was assumed to represent the economic
scale of a jurisdiction. The “conduit" outward centrality Cj was normalized by an economic scale of an jurisdiction
j as it was supposed that the total amount of foreign capital passing through the jurisdiction j was proportional to the
economic scale of the jurisdiction j. When the total amount was not proportional, the “conduit" outward centrality Cj
became large and it was suggested that the jurisdiction j functioned as “conduit." They supposed that a jurisdiction with
its “conduit" outward centralities exceeding 1 functioned as “conduit," comparing with the jurisdictions empirically
known as “conduit."
Calculation of the Amount of Foreign Capital
In the calculation of the “sink" centrality Sj and “conduit" outward centrality Cj , the amount of foreign capital was
assumed to be the sum of the value multiplied operating income by shareholding ratio for each company (Garcia-
Bernardo et al. 2017). Thus, financial information of each company was necessary to calculate “sink" centrality Sj
and “conduit" outward centrality Cj . As a preliminary survey of this analysis, we examined five MNCs: Amazon,
Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Starbucks. These MNC’s affiliates were playing an important role in the international
tax avoidance (US Senate 2013; Maine and Nguyen 2017 et al.). As a result, we found that availability of financial
information about the affiliates was 15%. In addition, no financial information was included in the database regarding
affiliates that played an important role in international tax avoidance. This suggested that it was difficult to use financial
information and analyze the MNCs that involved in international tax avoidance, although previous studies have mainly
used financial information of each affiliate to analyze MNCs’ international profit shifting (Huizinga and Laeven 2008
et al.).
We aim to analyze large MNCs such as the five MNCs. Generally, large MNCs face a higher risk when implementing
international profit shifting because the total amount of tax to pay are large. To overcome the difficulty of obtaining
financial information of their affiliates, we measure the amount of foreign capital focusing on substantial ownership
links and assume that the greater the number of the substantial ownership links, the more the capital flows. Here, a
shareholding relationship of 10% or more is considered as a substantial ownership link. It is appropriate to use 10%
or more shareholding relationships as the proxy for capturing the amount of foreign capital for international taxation
because shareholders that own 10% or more of shares are subject to the controlled foreign company legislation (CFC
rules), which is so-called anti-tax haven regime (Yoshimura 2008).
Centrality for affiliates
To identify MNC’s affiliates key companies, that are “holding" and “conduit" companies, we propose the “holding"
company and “conduit" company centralities. Since the “holding" company and “conduit" company centralities cap-
ture the amount of foreign capital by the number of substantial ownership links, the centralities do not need financial
information such as operating income.
5Although there was “conduit" inward centrality, we explain only “conduit" outward centrality because the “conduit" company
centrality is based on the “conduit" outward centrality.
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Holding Company Centrality
On the basis of the “sink" centrality Sj , we define “holding" company centrality to identify MNCs’ affiliates func-
tioning as “holding." The “holding" company centrality measures the amount of foreign capital held by an affiliate
and identify the affiliates holding a lot of foreign capital from other affiliates. The “holding" company centrality Ha
evaluates the amount of foreign capital held by an affiliate a as follows: First, we calculate the difference between
the total number of substantial ownership links where foreign capital enters the affiliate a and the total number of
substantial ownership links where foreign capital leaves the affiliate a. Next, we divide the difference by the total
number of substantial ownership links where capital flows in the GON. Finally, the centrality is normalized using the
economic scale of the affiliate a.
Ha =
kina − kouta∑
b∈M k
in
b
·
∑
b∈M (k
in
b + k
out
b )
kina + k
out
a
(3)
Here, M is the MNC that controls affiliates; a is an affiliate of the MNC M , kina is the number of the in-degree of
the affiliate a (the total number of substantial ownership links where foreign capital enters the affiliate a); kouta is the
number of the out-degree of the affiliate a (the total number of substantial ownership links where foreign capital leaves
the affiliate a). kina + k
out
a is the number of the degree of the affiliate a (the total number of ownership links tied with
the affiliate a) and is assumed to represent the economic scale of the affiliate a. The “holding" company centrality Ha
is normalized by an economic scale of an affiliate a as it is supposed that the difference between the amount of foreign
capital entering the affiliate a and those leaving the affiliate a is proportional to the economic scale of the affiliate a.
When the difference is not proportional, the “holding" centrality Ha becomes large and it is suggested that the affiliate
a is likely to function as “holding." In this analysis, we suppose that an affiliate with its “holding" company centrality
exceeding 0 has the possibility of identification as a "holding" company.
Conduit Company Centrality
On the basis of “conduit" centrality Cj , we define “conduit" company centrality to identify MNCs’ affiliates function-
ing as “conduit." The “conduit" company centrality measures the amount of foreign capital passed through an affiliate
and identifies the affiliates allowing foreign capital to be routed. The “conduit" company centrality Ta evaluates the
amount of foreign capital routed to the “holding" companies through an affiliate a as follows: First, we divide the
total number of substantial ownership links where foreign capital passes through the affiliate a and flows to “holding"
companies by the total number of substantial ownership links where capital flows in the GON. Then, the centrality is
normalized using the economic scale of the affiliate a.
Ta =
kina∑
b∈M k
in
b · koutb
·
∑
b∈M (k
in
b + k
out
b )
kina + k
out
a
(4)
Here, M is the MNC that controls affiliates; a is an affiliate of the MNC M ; kina is the number of the in-degree
of the affiliate a (the total number of substantial ownership links where foreign capital passes through the affiliate
a and flows to “holding" companies); kina + k
out
a is the number of the degree of the affiliate a (the total number of
substantial ownership links tied with the affiliate a) and is assumed to represent the economic scale of the affiliate a.
The “conduit" company centrality Ta is normalized by an economic scale of an affiliate a because it is supposed that
the total number amount of foreign capital passing through the affiliate a is proportional to the economic scale of the
affiliate a. When the total amount was not proportional, the “conduit" centrality Ta becomes large and it is suggested
that the affiliate a is likely to function as a “conduit." In this analysis, we suppose that an affiliate with its “conduit"
company centrality exceeding 0 has the possibility of identification as a "conduit" company.
Hierarchical Identification Algorithm
Assuming that a “holding" company and a “conduit" company make hierarchical relationships (see the Key Companies
subsection), we calculate the “holding" company centrality Ha and “conduit" company centrality Ta following the
algorithms indicated in Figure 3. We start the calculation from the first ownership layer. First, we calculate the
“holding" company centrality Ha of an affiliate (e.g. abc affiliate) in the first ownership layer. If the “holding"
company centrality Ha exceeds 0 and , then we go to the second ownership layer and calculate the “conduit" company
ownership centrality of affiliates held by abc affiliate. If there is a affiliate (e.g. def affiliate) whose “conduit" company
centrality Ta exceeds 0, abc affiliate is identified as a “holding" company and def affiliate is identified as a “conduit"
company. Next, we calculate the “holding" company centrality Ha of def affiliate. If the “holding" company centrality
7
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layer=layer+1
Third 
county 
type
layer=1
No
Yes
Yes
No
Ta  > 0
Yes
layer=layer-1 
Yes
No
No
layer > 0
Ha > 0
Figure 3: Flow chart of our model. a indicates a layer. First of all, the “holding" company centrality Ha is calculated
for affiliates in the first ownership layer. Of it exceeds 0, the “conduit" company centrality Ta is calculated for affiliates
held by the affiliate with the “holding" company centrality Ha exceeding 0.
exceeds 0 and def affiliate satisfies the condition of the third country type, def affiliate is identified as a “holding and "
conduit company because def affiliate is also a “conduit" company toward abc affiliate. Following this algorithm, the
“holding" company and “conduit" company centralities are calculated for all affiliate of each MNC.
Headquarter
1st layer 
2nd layer
3rd layer
4th layer
a
b c d
e
h
f
g
Figure 4: Ownership structure of MNC M . the circles indicate the headquarter and its affiliates; the lines indicate
the substantial ownership links; the labels indicate the name of the affiliates; and the dotted lines indicate the division
the ownership layer.
Figure 4 shows a ownership structure of a MNC M as an example. We use the MNC M for the explanation of the
algorithm. The algorithm is applied to the MNE M as follows: First, we calculate the “holding" company centrality
Ha of the affiliate a in the ownership first layer. Since the “holding" company centrality Ha of the affiliate a exceeds
0 and the affiliate a satisfies the conditions of the third country type, the “conduit" company centrality is calculated
regarding each affiliate tied with the affiliate a by the substantial ownership links, namely, the affiliates b, c, and d.
Within these three affiliates b, c, and d, the “conduit" company centrality Tb of the affiliate b exceeds 0. Thus, the
affiliate a is identified as a “holding" company toward the affiliates b, c, and d, while the affiliate b is identified as a
“conduit" company toward the affiliate a. Second, we calculate the “holding" company centrality Hb of the affiliate
b because its “conduit" company centrality Tb exceeds 0. Since the “holding" company centrality Hb of the affiliate
b exceeds 0 and the affiliate b satisfies the conditions of the third country type, the “conduit" company centrality is
calculated regarding each affiliate tied with the affiliate b by the substantial ownership links, namely, the affiliates e
and f . Within these two affiliates e and f , the “conduit" company centrality Te of the affiliate e exceeds 0. Thus,
the affiliate b is identified as a “holding" company toward the affiliates e and f , while the affiliate e is identified as a
“conduit" company toward the affiliate b. Because the affiliate b is not only a “holding" company toward the affiliates e
and f but also a “conduit" company toward the affiliate a, we regard the affiliate b as a “holding and conduit" company.
Third, we calculate the “holding" company centrality He of the affiliate e because its “conduit" company centrality Te
8
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exceeds 0. Although the affiliate e satisfies the condition of the third country type, the affiliate e is not identified as a
“holding" company because its “holding" centralityHe does not exceed 0. There is no other affiliates whose “conduit"
company centrality exceeds 0 within the affiliates tied with the affiliates b by the substantial ownership links, namely,
the affiliates e and f . Fourth, we return to the first ownership layer and calculate the “holding" centrality of the
affiliate h. The “holding" centrality Hh of the affiliate h does not exceeds 0 and there is no other affiliates in the first
ownership layer. Finally, we finish our identification. We calculate the “holding" company and “conduit" company
centralities following this algorithm and identify the key companies of the MNCs listed in the Fortune 500 (subject to
this analysis).
Results and Discussion
We demonstrate the characteristics, structure, and communities of the GON. Regarding five MNCs whose affiliates
play an important role in the international tax avoidance, we confirm the validity of our model by verifying how our
model identifies the affiliates in percentage. Of the 361,166 affiliates holding (directly or indirectly) by MNCs listed
in the Fortune Global 500 (subject to this analysis), our model identifies 6223 affiliates as the key companies that are
at risk of the international profit shifting. With the behavior of the key companies, it is revealed how key companies
distribute throughout jurisdictions and in the GON. We also point out that the results have certain bias due to the bias
of the recording ratio of the database.
Verification of Proposed Model
We surveyed five MNCs: Amazon, Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Starbucks. We checked the extent our model
identifies affiliates that play an important role in international tax avoidance. The reason selecting these five MNCs is
that we can identify the affiliates they use for the international tax avoidance (UK Parliament 2013; US Senate 2013;
Fuest et al. 2013; Gravelle 2013; Kleinbard 2013; Connell 2014; Maine and Nguyen 2017 et al.).
Using Google, which actually exists, as an example, we describe how the algorithms identify key companies, that
are “holding" and “conduit" companies, by showing an important part of the result. Figure 5 (a) shows 190 affiliates
that are directly or indirectly tied with Google LLC, which is the headquarter of Google, by the substantial ownership
links6. We calculated “holding" company and “conduit" company centralities for the 190 affiliates, following the
hierarchical identification algorithm. In Figure 5 (b), we show that the first ownership layer is indicated by a green
rectangle; one affiliate is painted in red because its “holding" company centrality exceeds 0, and one affiliate is painted
in yellow because its “conduit" company centrality exceeds 0. Therefore, one affiliate painted in red is identified as
a “holding" company. Figure 5 (c) shows the result of the calculation in the second ownership layer; this is indicated
by an orange rectangle. One affiliate is painted in red because its “holding" company centrality exceeds 0, and five
affiliates are painted in yellow because their “conduit" company centralities exceed 0. The one affiliate painted in
red in the second ownership layer is identified as a “holding and conduit"company because its “conduit" company
centrality exceeds 0 in the first ownership layer. On the other hand, in the second ownership layer, only one affiliate
is identified as a “conduit" company because four affiliates do not satisfy the conditions of the third country type,
even though their “conduit" company centralities exceed 0. Figure 5 (d) shows the result of the calculation in the
third ownership layer indicated by a blue rectangle. One affiliate is painted in red because its “holding" company
centrality exceeds 0, and two companies are painted in yellow because their “conduit" company centralities exceed 0.
The one affiliate painted in red in the third ownership layer is identified as a “holding and conduit" company because
its “conduit" company centrality exceeds 0 in the second ownership layer. On the other hand, no affiliate is identified
as a “conduit" company in the third ownership layer because no company satisfies the conditions of the third country
type, even though their “conduit" company centralities exceed 0. The hierarchical identification algorithm works in
this way regarding Google.
Table 1 summarizes the percentage of the five MNCs for the application of our model and their affiliates that play an
important role in international tax avoidance. The column of “Affiliates" shows the number of affiliates; the columns
of “Holding," “Holding & Conduit," and “Conduit" show the number of affiliates identified as the key companies; and
the column of “Reported" shows the ratio these key companies and affiliates play in the international tax avoidance. As
the column of “Reported” showed, although the ratio varied from 20% to 100%, depending on MNCs, we confirmed
the validity of our model because the identified key companies included affiliates that played the most important role
in the international profit shifting of these five MNCs.
6We considered Google LLC as the headquarter of Google because the Orbis database 2015 does not include the information of
Alphabet Inc, which was established in 2015.
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(a) Google affiliates (b) First layer
(c) Second layer (d) Third Layer
Figure 5: Example of Google. (a) shows all Google’s affiliates. (b)-(d) show the result of calculation in the first-third
layers, respectively. A company whose holding centrality H exceeds 0 is painted in red and a company whose conduit
centrality C exceeds 0 is painted in yellow. Green, orange, and blue rectangles show the first-third layer, respectively.
Table 1: Number of key companies identified.
MNCs Affiliates Holding Holding & Conduit Conduit Reported
Amazon 312 2 0 2 25%
Apple 152 1 1 0 50%
Google 190 3 2 0 20%
Microsoft 266 8 1 1 20%
Starbucks 274 1 1 0 100%
Basic Characteristics of the GON
The total number of node u included in the GON is 59,581,452, and the total number of link e is 42,801,276. We
show the structural properties of the GON in Figure 6. Figure 6 (a,b) represents the probability density distributions
of nodal in- and out- degrees, respectively. On a double logarithmic scale, both the distributions have a significant
straight portion of the intermediate values of the degrees. This indicates a power law decay of the degree distribution
with P (kin/out) ∼ k−γin/outin/out characterizing a scale free nature of the network. The slope of the distributions gives
the values of the exponents γin = 2.44, and γout = 3.00. The average nodal in- or out-degree is found to be
〈kin〉 = 〈kout〉 = 0.718. Approximately 0.119% of all links indicate cross-share relationships. The uniqueness
among the neighbors of a node is measured in terms of clustering coefficients, which also measures the three-point
correlation. In Figure 6 (c), we show the average clustering coefficient 〈C(k)〉, which decreases as the total degree
k increases, observed in many other real-world networks. The nodal degree-degree correlation is measured by the
average nearest neighbor degree 〈knn(k)〉. If 〈knn(k)〉 decreases with k, the network is called disassortative; if it
increases with k, the network is known as assortative. As can be seen from Figure 6 (d), 〈knn(k)〉 has an unusual
10
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Figure 6: Structural properties of the GON. The probability density distributions P for nodal (a) in-degree kin and
(b) out-degreekout. Solid lines indicate best power law fit to the data. (c) The average clustering coefficient 〈C(k)〉 is
plotted with total degree k. (d) The variation of average nearest neighbor degree 〈knn(k)〉 is shown as a function of
nodal degree k. Logarithmic binning of the data is used in (a) and (b).
shape for low k < 200. For low k, it gradually decreases until k < 20; then, it increases until k < 200. However, it
decreases with very high k values, indicating a disassortative nature.
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Figure 7: The probability density distributions D(s) of community sizes s for the GON. The red line indicates the
best power law fit to the data
Community detection is conducted on the GON using the Infomap method (Rosvall and Bergstrom 2008). This detects
363,991 communities with wide variation in their sizes s, where the size is measured by the total number of nodes
within the community. Figure 7 is the probability density distribution D(s) of the sizes of the communities. On the
double logarithmic scale, the distribution has a considerably long straight portion reflecting a power law behavior of
the form D(s) ∼ s−2.60.
We study the connected components when the network is viewed as an undirected network. The largest connected
component of the network is known as the giant weakly connected component (GWCC). As can be seen from Figure 8,
the network consists of a very large GWCC with N = 6, 827, 299 nodes and L = 8, 367, 999 links, which is 11.459%
of the GON. The small components with size x < 100 can be fitted with a power law decay of form nx ∼ x−3.16. In
the later part of our study, we investigate the GWCC of the network.
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Figure 8: Distribution nx of the component sizes x in the network. The red line indicates the best power law fit to
the data
Bow-tie Srtucture of the GWCC
The bow-tie structure is uncovered from the GWCC. The definitions of the different regions of the bow-tie structure
are given as follows:
• The giant strongly connected component (GSCC): The largest region where any two nodes are reachable
through directed paths.
• IN component: The nodes from which GSCC is reachable through directed paths.
• OUT component: The nodes that are reachable from the GSCC through directed paths.
• Tendrils (TE): The rest of the nodes in the GWCC.
The number of companies in each components is shown in Table 2. The shape is highly asymmetric; the nodes in the
strongly connected component and the OUT component are only 0.033% and 0.227%, respectively, whereas those of
the IN component is 17.015%. The results are consistent with the previous research analyzing the ownership network
of transnational corporations in terms of the small OUT component; however, the proportion of the TE is 82.725%,
very large as compared with that of the previous research (Vitali et al. 2011). This is probably because our data are
much bigger than those of the previous research.
Table 3 shows the distribution of the shortest distance from the node on the IN component to the node on the GSCC
and the shortest distance from the node on the GSCC to the node on the OUT component. Nearly 80% of the nodes
belonging to the IN component had a distance of 2-3 to the GSCC, and 80% of the nodes that belong to the OUT
component had a distance of 1-2 from the GSCC. The distances from the IN component to the GSCC are longer than
those from the GSCC to the OUT component. The shape of the bow-tie structure is different from those shown in
other networks (Vazquez et al. 2002; Csete M and Doyle J 2004; Chakraborty et al. 2018 et al.).
Identification of Key Companies
A total of 361,166 companies were extracted from the GON as affiliates of the MNCs listed in the Fortune Global 500
(subject to this analysis). Figure 9 shows the geographic distribution of the affiliates. About 30% of the affiliates are
Table 2: Bow-tie structure: Sizes of different components.
Component Companies Ratio (%)
GSCC 2239 0.033
IN 1,161,655 17.015
OUT 15,514 0.227
TE 5,647,891 82.725
Total 6,827,299 100
“Ratio" refers to the ratio of the number of companies to the total number of companies in GWCC.
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Table 3: The distribution of the shortest distance from nodes in the IN component to those in the GSCC and from
nodes in the GSCC to those in the OUT component.
IN to GSCC OUT to GSCC
Distance Companies Ratio Companies Ratio
1 98,342 8% 7405 48%
2 564,328 49% 5131 33%
3 296,760 26% 1897 12%
4 123,753 11% 712 5%
5 46,106 4% 269 2%
6 18,258 2% 54 0%
7 7883 1% 37 0%
8 3226 0% 4 0%
9 1563 0% 2 0%
10 705 0% 3 0%
11 319 0% - 0%
12 183 0% - 0%
13 65 0% - 0%
14 37 0% - 0%
15 33 0% - 0%
16 34 0% - 0%
17 13 0% - 0%
18 16 0% - 0%
19 23 0% - 0%
20 8 0% - 0%
Total 1,161,655 100% 15, 514 100%
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Figure 9: Top 10 Jurisdictions where affiliates are located. The top 10 jurisdictions of the affiliates of the MNCs
subject to this analysis. The horizontal axis indicates the locations, the vertical axis indicates the number of affiliates,
and the labels indicate the percentage accounting for the total number of the affiliates. CN is mainland China; GB is
the UK; DE is Germany; ES is Spain; FR is France; AU is Austria; IT is Italy; JP is Japan; and NL is the Netherlands.
located in the US, and most of the other affiliates are located in Europe and East Asia. This might be because many
headquarters of the MNCs listed in the Fortune 500 (subject to this analysis) are located in those jurisdictions and
those jurisdictions have large markets. We also point out that the bias included the dataset might cause the locations
of the affiliates to concentrate on certain areas, that are the US, Europe, and East Asia.
Our model identified 3316 affiliates as “holding", 1596 affiliates as “holding and conduit" and 1311 affiliates as “con-
duit." The left bar plots of Figure 10 show the geographical distributions of the headquarters and the key companies of
the MNCs listed in the Fortune Global 500 (subject to this analysis). First bar plot shows regarding the headquarters.
The US, China (CN), and Japan (JP) are the top three jurisdictions as the locations of the headquarters. Germany
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Figure 10: Distribution of the headquarters and the key companies of the MNCs subject to this analysis. The left
bar plots show the geographical distributions, while the right bar plots show the distributions in the bow-tie structure
of the GWCC of the GON. The bar plots of both sides show regarding the headquarters, the “holding" companies,
the “holding and conduit" companies, and conduit" companies from top to bottom. REST stands for the component
except the GWCC.
(DE) and France (FR) also have many headquarters, compared with the other jurisdictions. Second bar plot shows
regarding the “holding" companies. The Netherlands (NL), the US, and the UK (GB) are remarkable as the locations
of the “holding" companies. Germany (DE) and Spain (ES) have more the “holding" companies, compared with the
other jurisdictions. Third bar plot shows regarding the “holding and conduit" companies. The US, the UK (GB), and
the Netherlands (NL) are still noticeable as the locations of the “holding and conduit" companies. Germany (DE) and
Spain (ES) have more the “holding and conduit" companies, compared with the other jurisdictions. Fourth bar plot
shows regarding the “conduit" companies. The distribution of the “conduit" companies is slightly different from those
of the “holding" companies and the “holding and conduit" companies. In addition to the Netherlands (NL) and the
UK (GB), has many “conduit" companies are located in the Netherlands (NL), Hong Kong (HK), the UK (GB), and
Germany (DE), the British Virgin Islands (VG) is also perceptible. Many key companies are located in Europe, espe-
cially the Netherlands and the UK, although the two jurisdictions are not at the top five jurisdictions as the locations
of the headquarters. The two jurisdictions are empirically known for their taxation merits, which MNCs can exploit
through the acquisition of intermediate companies for the international taxation (Eicke 2009). Meanwhile, China,
France, Austria, Italy, and Japan are not at the top five jurisdictions of the number of the key companies, even though
these jurisdictions have many affiliates (see Figure 9).
On the other hand, the right bar plots of Figure 10 shows the distributions of the headquarters and the key companies
in the bow-tie structure of the GWCC of the GON. First bar plot shows regarding the headquarters. Even though the
bow-tie structure (the GWSS) accounts for only 11.433% of the entire GON, most of the headquarters are located in
the GSCC, the IN component, or the TE. Moreover, it is noticeable that their key companies are mostly located in the
IN component of the bow-tie structure, although the IN component accounts for only 1.95% of the entire GON.
Withholding Tax
We examine the relationship between the number of the key companies and the possibility of being used for treaty
shopping in detail because the major incentives for establishing key companies is to avoid the withholding tax imposed
on the profits of MNCs. To examine whether a relationship exists between the location of the key companies and the
possibility to be used for treaty shopping, we use the withholding tax centrality as an indicator of the possibility to
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be used for treaty shopping (Nakamoto and Ikeda 2018). The withholding tax centrality is calculated based on the
withholding tax rates imposed by each jurisdiction on dividends. The higher the withholding tax centrality is, the
more a jurisdiction is likely to be used for treaty shopping.
0 0.0706
Figure 11: “Holding" companies and Treaty shopping. The size of the circles indicates the number of “holding"
companies and the depth of the color indicates the possibility to be used for treaty shopping by the jurisdiction.
0 0.0706
Figure 12: “Holding & conduit" companies and Treaty shopping. The size of the circles indicates the number of
“holding and conduit" companies and the depth of the color indicates the possibility to be used for treaty shopping by
the jurisdiction.
In Figures 11-13, the size of the circles shows the geographic distributions of the key companies used for treaty
shopping. The depth of the color shows the withholding tax centrality, which represents the possibility to be used for
treaty shopping. The more jurisdictions that are likely to be used for treaty shopping, the darker the color. There seems
a certain relationship between the number of the key companies and the possibility of being used for treaty shopping.
To examine the relationship between the location of the key companies and the possibility to be used for treaty shop-
ping more precisely, we perform regression analyses using the number of the key companies as a target variable and
the possibility to be used for treaty shopping as an explanatory variable. Figure 14 shows the results of the regression
analyses. Regarding “holding" companies, an obtained regression equation is y = 14.671 + 1914.126x and the ad-
justed R-squared is 0.0888. The t-value of the intercept is 2.856, and the its p-value is 0.005154; this is significant at
1%. The t-value of the withholding tax centrality is 3.395, and its p-value was 0.000964; this is significant at 0.1%.
Regarding “holding and conduit" companies, an obtained regression equation is y = 4.267 + 432.241x and adjusted
R-squared is 0.08672. The t-value of the intercept is 3.475; and its p-value is 0.000751, and it is significant at 0.1%.
The t-value of the withholding tax centrality is 3.283; and its p-value is 0.001406; this is significant at 1%. Regarding
“conduit" companies, an obtained regression equation is y = 4.678+1188.987x and the adjusted R-squared is 0.2073.
The t-value of the intercept is 2.365; and its p-value is 0.0197; this is significant at 10%. The t-value of the withholding
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0 0.0706
Figure 13: “Conduit" companies and Treaty shopping. The size of the circles indicates the number of “conduit"
companies and the depth of the color indicates the possibility to be used for treaty shopping by the jurisdiction.
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Figure 14: Key companies and withholding tax centrality. The vertical axis indicates a number of key companies
and the horizontal axis is the withholding tax centrality, which indicates the possibility to be used for treaty shopping.
tax centrality is 5.551; its p-value is 1.9×10−7; this is significant at 0.1%. Figure 14 is scattered plots with the number
of key companies identified on the X-axis and the withholding tax centrality on the Y-axis. The straight line is the
obtained regression line.
The locations of the key companies clearly correlate with the possibilities for the locations to be used for treaty shop-
ping. It is found that treaty shopping has a greater influence on the number of “holding" companies and “conduit"
companies because their coefficient of withholding tax centrality is high. It is also worthy of attention that the with-
holding tax centrality can explain the number of “conduit" companies by about 20%.
Ownership Chains
Establishment of intermediate companies or the key companies leads to a diversion of FDI. We analyze the investments
via the key companies. Tables 4-6 show for what jurisdictions the top three jurisdictions with many key companies are
intermediate destinations. The column of “Subsidiary" shows the location of affiliates where the key companies hold
shares, and the column of “Shareholder" shows the location of affiliates holding shares of the key companies.
Table 4 indicates the “holding" companies located in the Netherlands, the US, and the UK, which are the top three ju-
risdictions with many “holding" companies. The investments through the Netherlands (NL) are the major investments
among Western jurisdictions, such as Ireland (IE) and Germany (DE). The investments through “holding" companies
located in the United States are the investments relating to Canada (CA) and Mexico (MX), which are geographically
close to the US. It is also the investments related to Japan (JP), which is an East Asian jurisdiction. The investments
through the United Kingdom (GB) are the investments by the Commonwealth jurisdictions, such as South Africa (ZA)
and India (IN).
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Table 4: Direct shareholders and subsidiaries of the “holding" companies.
the Netherlands the United States the United Kingdom
Subsidiary Shareholder Subsidiary Shareholder Subsidiary Shareholder
IE 9% US 35% CA 18% GB 14% US 15% US 34%
US 8% GB 11% GB 13% CA 12% ZA 5% n.a. 16%
n.a. 7% FR 10% IE 5% JP 12% IN 5% FR 7%
DE 7% DE 6% JP 4% DE 10% NL 4% CH 4%
FR 6% CH 4% MX 4% FR 8% IE 3% DE 4%
IE is Ireland; DE is Germany; FR is France; GB is the UK; CH is Switzerland; CA is Canada; JP is Japan; MX is
Mexico; ZA is South Africa; IN is India; NL is the Netherlands; and n.a. is no information.
Table 5: Direct shareholders and subsidiaries of the “holding and conduit" companies.
the United States the United Kingdom the Netherlands
Subsidiary Shareholder Subsidiary Shareholder Subsidiary Shareholder
CA 20% GB 15% ZA 31% US 29% UA 17% US 19%
CN 13% FR 15% AU 9% n.a. 27% BE 9% GB 14%
LU 9% CH 11% LU 7% ZA 12% GB 6% PL 8%
GB 9% DE 11% BR 5% FR 5% NG 5% FR 7%
HK 5% CA 7% VG 5% BM 4% n.a. 4% DE 7%
CA is Canada; CN is mainland China; LU is Luxembourg; GB is the UK; HK is Hong Kong; FR is France; CH is
Switzerland; DE is Germany; ZA is South Africa; AU is Austria; BR is Brazil; VG is the British Virgin Islands; BM
is the Bermuda Islands; UA is the United Arab Emirates; BE is Belgium; NG is Nigeria; PL is Poland; and n.a. is no
information.
Table 5 provides details of the “holding and conduit" companies located in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, which
are the top three jurisdictions with many “holding and conduit" companies. The investments through the US include
many investments related to China (CN), which is an East Asian jurisdiction. The investments through the UK (GB)
consist of many investments from the Bermuda Islands (BM) and the British Virgin Islands (VG), which are British
overseas territories and known as so-called tax havens. In addition, “holding and conduit" companies located in the
UK make much investment in South Africa (ZA). It is noteworthy that South Africa (ZA) occupies a high proportion
of both columns of “Subsidiary" and “Shareholder." The Investments in South Africa (ZA) from South Africa (ZA)
via the UK (GB) suggests the existence of round tripping (IMF 2004). The “holding and conduit" companies located
in the Netherlands (NL) make much investment in the United Arab Emirates (UA) due to oil companies.
Table 6: Direct shareholders and subsidiaries of the “conduit" companies.
the Netherlands Hong Kong the United Kingdom
Subsidiary Shareholder Subsidiary Shareholder Subsidiary Shareholder
DE 13% ES 14% CN 60% KY 24% ES 28% NL 12%
GB 10% GB 14% VG 11% BM 13% IE 10% DE 10%
PL 7% US 13% TW 6% VG 11% ID 8% IE 9%
BE 7% DE 11% NL 4% FR 6% DE 7% US 7%
ES 7% CH 8% BM 2% CN 5% NL 6% AU 7%
DE is Germany; GB is the UK; PL is Poland; BE is Belgium; ES is Spain; CH is Switzerland; CN is mainland China;
VG is the British Virgin Islands; TW is Taiwan; NL is the Netherlands; BM is the Bermuda Islands; FR is France; IE
is Ireland; ID is Indonesia; and AU is Austria.
Table 6 shows the results of “conduit" companies located in the Netherlands, Hong Kong, and the UK, which are the
top three jurisdictions with many “conduit" companies. The investments through the “conduit" companies located in
the Netherlands (NL) are mainly the investments related to Western jurisdictions. The investments through Hong Kong
(HK) are mainly investments in mainland China (CN) and Taiwan (TW). In addition, the interesting point is that both
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columns “Shareholder" and “Subsidiary" have the Cayman Islands (KY), the British Virgin Islands, and the Bermuda
Islands for investments. These locations are British Overseas Territories used as tax havens. The investments through
the “conduit" companies located in the UK (GB) are many investments related to Indonesia (ID) and Australia (AU).
As a general trend, the key companies are close to the geographical jurisdictions of the headquarters. In addition
to the trend, not a few investments through the US are related to East Asian jurisdictions such as Japan (JP) and
China (CN). The investments through the UK or former leasehold land Hong Kong are mainly the investments in
the Commonwealth and the British overseas territories. It is notable that affiliates located in so-called tax havens are
found to have connections with the “holding and conduit" or “conduit" companies. This implies affiliates related to
tax havens are the lower ownership layer in the ownership structures.
Headquarters
Finally, we analyze whether there is a difference between the key companies in the location of the headquarters.
In Table 7, we use our model to show the location of the headquarters holding the key companies. In all the key
companies, which are “holding," “holding and conduit," and “conduit" companies, the headquarters located in the
US own the most key companies. The reason is that approximately 25% of the MNCs listed in the Fortune Global
500 (subject to this analysis) are located in the US. In contrast, the MNCs in the UK own many key companies as
compared with the number of the headquarters of the MNCc listed in the Fortune Global 500 (subject to this analysis).
It is suggested that MNCs in the UK tend to have many affiliates that can play an important role in international profit
shifting as compared with MNCs in other jurisdictions.
Table 7: Top five locations of the headquarters holding the key companies.
Holding Holding & Conduit Conduit
US 27% US 30% US 27%
GB 13% GB 19% GB 16%
JP 11% CN 9% CN 13%
DE 11% DE 8% DE 10%
CN 8% JP 7% JP 8%
GB is the UK; JP is Japan; DE is Germany; and CN is mainland China.
Table 8: “Holding" companies of top three jurisdictions.
the United States the United Kingdom Japan
GB 15% NL 15% US 22%
NL 13% US 12% GB 13%
DE 9% ES 7% NL 12%
LU 8% LU 7% DE 6%
FR 5% DE 6% SG 5%
GB is the UK; NL is the Netherlands; DE is Germany; LU is Luxembourg; FR is France; ES is Spain; and SG is
Singapore.
Tables 8-10 summarize the locations of the key companies held by MNCs in the top three jurisdiction in Table 7.
Moreover, the tables show whether there is any difference in the location of the key companies and the locations of
MNCs. Table 8 shows “holding" companies are mainly located in Western jurisdictions for any MNCs in the top three
jurisdictions. MNCs in Japan (JP) also own many “holding" companies in Singapore (SG). This seems to reflect that
many Japanese MNCs prefer to establish their affiliates in Singapore (SG) when doing business in Southeast Asia.
On the other hand, Tables 9-10 show “holding and conduit" and “conduit" companies, which are at the lower layer of
the ownership structure, are located in the jurisdictions where their headquarters are located for any MNCs located in
the top three jurisdictions. In the case of the US MNCs, 12% of “holding and conduit" companies are located in the
US, in the case of the UK MNCs, 11% of “holding and conduit" companies are located in the UK, and in the case of
Chinese MNCs, 9% of “holding and conduit" companies are located in mainland China. Similarly, 8% of “conduit"
companies the US MNCs have are located in the US, 17% of “conduit" companies the UK MNCs have are located
in the UK, and 29% of “conduit" companies Chinese MNCs have are located in mainland China. Because the key
companies satisfies the third country type (see the Key Companies subsections in the Model section), affiliates located
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Table 9: “Holding and conduit" companies of top three jurisdictions.
the United States the United Kingdom China
NL 12% GB 11% HK 12%
US 12% NL 9% CN 9%
GB 9% DE 9% VG 9%
DE 7% US 8% KY 8%
ES 7% ES 6% US 8%
NL is the Netherlands; GB is the UK; DE is Germany; ES is Spain; HK is Hong Kong; CN is mainland China; VG is
the British Virgin Islands; and KY is the Cayman Islands.
Table 10: “Conduit" companies of top three jurisdictions.
the United States the United Kingdom China
GB 17% GB 17% CN 29%
ES 14% IE 10% HK 24%
DE 9% US 10% VG 9%
US 8% ES 9% KY 6%
RU 6% DE 6% BM 6%
GB is the UK; ES is Spain; DE is Germany; RU is Russia; IE is Ireland; CN is mainland China; HK is Hong Kong;
VG is the British Virgin Islands; KY is the Cayman Islands; and the BM is the Bermuda Islands.
in different jurisdictions from the location of the headquarter possess key companies located in the jurisdiction where
their headquarters are located. This suggests the possibility of performing round tripping (IMF 2004). In addition,
it is noteworthy that Chinese MNCs have many affiliates in jurisdictions known as so-called tax havens, such as the
Cayman Islands (KY), the British Virgin Islands (VG), and the Bermuda Islands (BM).
Conclusions
In the global economy, the existence of intermediate company is becoming a problem. The purpose of this paper is
to identify intermediate companies, or key companies, that are at high risk in international profit shifting in order to
clarify the actual situation of the intermediate companies. We analyzed large MNCs since large MNCs have a high
risk of international profit shifting.
Our proposed model focuses on the position the affiliates occupy in the ownership structure of each MNC, rather
than using financial information as used by previous studies. In analyzing the ownership structure, the GON was
constructed using the information in the Orbis database to establish the relationship between the key companies and
MNCs. Thus, we analyzed the basic features of the GON used in this analysis. We confirmed the validity of our
model to identify that affiliates play an important role in international profit shifting of five selected MNCs. We use
MNCs listed in the Fortune Global 500 (subject to this analysis) for our model. It was found that many identified key
companies exist in well-known jurisdictions such as the Netherlands and the UK. On the GON, it was found that such
identified companies concentrated in the IN component of the bow-tie structure.
Considering the results in the context of international taxation, we found that there is a relationship between the
number of identified key companies and treaty shopping. Thus, it is clear that there is a difference in the investment’s
routes depending on the location of key companies. For example, the investments related to East Asian jurisdictions
often pass through the key companies located in the US and the investments related to the Commonwealth tend to pass
through the key companies located in the UK. In addition, it was revealed that MNCs in the UK held the relatively
large number of key companies, and Chinese MNCs held many “conduit" companies in the so-called tax havens. It is
suggested that key companies not only receive a strong influence of the withholding tax rate but also strongly reflect the
historical, economic, and political relationships of the location of key companies. The key companies are a microcosm
of such various relationships. The future work should focus on network properties of the ownership structures in more
detail and cooperative analysis in the cross-section to better understand the GON.
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